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The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed in 
December of 1987 was hailed all over Europe, the United States, and the 
Soviet Union as a momentous step towards reducing the risk of nuclear war. 
Riding on this tide of public support, many officials of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the Warsaw Pact believe the time is ripe 
to conclude other negotiations on nuclear arms with a treaty on short-range 
weapons or even on strategic missiles. But others, especially many in Europe, 
worry that with a decreasing nuclear guarantee, Western Europe will be open 
for a conventional attack by tV  Warsaw Pact While not rejecting the idea of 
more extensive nuclear arms control agreements, they feel that the 
conventional balance must be addressed first.
It is commonly heard that the Warsaw Pact is "superior" in 
conventional weapons. This belief is share by many: Congress, the President, 
respected newspapers, European officials. Problems have arisen within 
NATO on how to counter this alleged superiority. An obvious solution for 
many defense experts is to increase conventional force levels. This raises a 
difficult question within the alliance: which countries should Increase their 
NATO expenditures? Neither the Europeans nor the Americans are eager to 
expand their defense budgets. Some Europeans accuse die United States of 
failing to live up to its NATO commitment; some in the U.S. insist that the 
Europeans do not want to pay their own defense bill and rely too heavily on 
the U.S.
The obvious solution may not be best. This paper explores the 
feasibility of a different approach. Instead of increasing conventional force 
levels and encouraging further Inner-Alliance cleavages, NATO's next step
2should be a reduction of offensive forces on both sides of the inner-German 
border. A first step in this direction is to create a zone that restricts the 
presence of the most offensive of the conventional ground-force weapons 
systems- tanks. This paper evaluates that possibility first by examining the 
current level of conventional forces in Europe, with an emphasis on tank 
systems. Next it studies the reasons for such a limited arms control 
agreement. Finally, it presents a plan that could be the basis for a new set of 
conventional arms negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
countries.
The likelihood of an overt military attack by the Soviet Union to 
dominate Western Europe is quite low. The Soviets have enough trouble 
supporting the current oommunist regimes in Eastern Europe and enough 
domestic economic problems that to attempt such a takeover would be 
foolish. But both the United States and the Soviet Union have their greatest 
concentration of forces in Central Europe and the possibility remains that 
tensions outside of the region-in the Middle Bast or Africa, for example- could 
escalate and drive the superpowers to war in Central Europe. Conventional 
reductions are still needed, then, even if the direct threat from the Soviets is 
no longer a strong probability, to reduce the incentives for a preemptive 
conventional attack when international tensions are high.
This plan does not solve all of Europe's security problems, but that is 
not its purpose. Any agreement which buys time for political and diplomatic 
processes, and delays an initial military confrontation in Europe that could 
escalate into a nuclear exchange, is of value enough in and of itself to pursue 
seriously. The world is imperfect and no arms control measures yet 
conceived will solve all problems for both sides. Yet marginal improvements
3can and should be made. A tank-restricted zone would be one such 
improvement.
» *  *  *
In order to make a lasting, significant treaty on conventional forces in 
Europe, it is necessary to understand how the situation stands today. A 
popular idea exists that Warsaw Pact forces are "superior" to NATO forces. 
While experts agree that the Pact has a more weapons in most conventional 
categories, there is no consensus that this makes the Pact forces better. A 
realistic evaluation requires more than a numerical comparison. Beyond the 
Bean Count, a publication by a Senate Armed Services subcommittee, lists 
thirteen main categories for evaluating the conventional balance in Europe:
1. Deployment of Forces* the capability of Soviet forces to mount a 
surprise attack and the ability for NATO to provide effective defense
2. Quantity of Major Weapons Systems (the "Bean count")
3. Quality of Major Weapons Systems
4. Force Readiness
5. Force Sustainability
6. Number of Active and Reserve Personnel
7. Quality of Personnel
8. Interoperability of Forces
9. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
10. Reliability of Allies
11. Geographic Factors
12. Ability to Make R&pid Transition to War (1)
Arguments that NATO forces are inferior based solely on bean counts 
are ignorant and misleading because they fail to explain the complexities 
involved in evaluating a military strength. Wars are never one or lost 
because of a single factor, not even when that factor covers the number of 
troops or weapons. History is replete with examples of wars that were one by 
toe smaller force: the battles of Auetorlits, Antietam, Fredericksburg, toe 
i r u lo n  of Russia# the North Korean in vaeion, toe battles in the Sinai, the
4Golan Heights, and even the Falklands War. (2) Other factors come into play 
in any conflict and even the most detailed of die numerical comparisons 
cannot evaluate them. Raw numerical data does not assess the differences in 
technology, logistical support, willingness to endure attrition, willingness to 
give up territory, various tactics used, or difference in goals. (3) Bean­
counting is useful because it can give parameters to a discussion on force 
effectiveness, but it is dangerous to ignore these other factors that can effect 
the outcome of a war and concentrate only on numbers of systems or people. 
(3) This section looks at thirteen factors to comprehensively evaluate the 
conventional balance. An emphasis is placed on the balance of tanks within 
that whole, where applicable.
Deployment of Forces
One of NATO's main concerns today is the peacetime deployment of 
Pact forces. NATO strategists worry that die Soviets have the ability to launch 
a "surprise" or "minimum warning" attack against Western Europe and it is 
a legitimate concern. In order to evaluate this capability, three factors must be 
considered: the location of the active-duty forces, their readiness, and their 
deployment in relation to the terrain. (4)
Warsaw Pact forces are deployed to take maximum advantage of a 
major flaw in NATO planning. The logistical support lines that serve all of 
NATO forces come in through ports in the Benelux countries and run 
parallel to the front, from north to south. (5) This part of Germany has the 
land best suitsd to attack by Pact forces^ because It is comparatively flat. (6) 
German, Dutch, British, and Belgian forcss a rt assigned to the defense of this 
•nto, but w est of die Belgian and Dutch forces are not even in Germany, and
5would require mobilization and travel time. The German forces there would 
be spread thinly to cover for the others until they arrived. Three divisions of 
U. S. reserve forces are the only reserves assigned for the region and only one 
brigade is in Germany. The equipment for two of the divisions is kept in the 
rear areas as part of the POMCUS (Pre-Positioned Materiel Configured to Unit 
Sets) program, but the soldiers would have to be flown over once 
mobilization has occurred. (7) Looking at this situation would be quite 
satisfying to a Warsaw Pact planner; NATO's most important supply lines are 
the most vulnerable. If Pact forces were to successfully push through NATO 
forces to this point, they could effectively end NATO's war effort.
The doctrine of Flexible Response requires a strong conventional line 
of defense on the inner-German border. The above passage shows it simply is 
not there in peacetime. Official estimates claim it would take from 1-3 days 
needed to move active duty forces into their "General Defense Positions." (8) 
The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, forward-deploys its most ready forces 
during peacetime. (9)
The number of forces within the Central Region, then, does not 
sufficiently explain how dangerous the situation could be for NATO. The 
over-all balance of forces in foe Central Europe region is fairly equal. (10) But 
the balance within 100 miles of the inner-German border is not, (10 and it is 
this forward deployment of ready Warsaw Pact forces that forms foe forest to 
NATO. The result is that some of NATO's weakest defense forces face some 
of the Warsaw Pacts strongest offensive forces. Soviet doctrine# as stated by 
Soviet defense officials, calls for rapid sudden breakthroughs that overwhelm 
the enemy before they can fully mobilize. (12) This region is a likely target 
for implementing such a plan, and the current deployment makes such a
6breakthrough plausible. The deployment of forces remains one of the most 
serious threats to NATO's conventional defense.
Quantity
Of course, the numbers are important. The actual numbers of weapons 
systems and personnel, however, are hard to accurately establish. The figures 
supplied by the Warsaw Pact do not always match up with those obtained by 
Western intelligence. As far as tanks alone are concerned, NATO uses two 
methods to obtain the actual count: the production method and the 
divisional strength method. (13) The former involves estimates of the 
capacity and output of the main Soviet tank factories, and how they may have 
improved or declined over time. Allowances for exports and retirement 
from service are made, and a total is given. The divisional strength method 
estimates the number of tanks that would be needed to equip all of the 
current Soviet divisions. Adjustments are then made for whether the 
division is in or out of Eastern Europe, the existence of independent take 
regiments that were introduced in foe Group of Soviet Forces Europe (GSFG) 
in the late 1970's and 1980's, and foe reserve tanks for training. (14) Although 
foe two methods come up with generally similar numbers, this shows foe 
difficulties in determining Soviet tank levels.
Numerical comparisons are complicated for other reasons as well. 
NATO military leaders tend to operate under "worse-case scenario" planning. 
This often leads them to use selective information. For example, the UK 
Ministry of Defense (MoD) excludes NATO tanks that would take two weeks 
to mobilize and beat foe front, yet indudes Pact tanks that are for use by only 
partially-manned divisions and would tanks weeks, if not months after
7mobilization to be battle-ready. (15) Different counts vary by scope region and 
definitions. Those differences are reflected in the outcomes. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a respected and oft-sited 
source, offers three questions to ask before any given count can be evaluated:
1. which forces are included and which are not?
2. how are the categories grouped, both in terms of geography and of 
equipment types?
3. how is combat effectiveness and readiness of equipment and units 
presented? (16)
With this preface, IISS offers the following numerical data for main 
battle tanks (MBT):
NATO Guidelines Area Atlantic-1Q-Uralg
Equipment NATO WP NATO WP
MBT 12,700 18,000 22,200 52,200 (17)
These numbers show that the Warsaw Pact does have a numerical advantage 
in tanks over the West. A problem arises in negotiations, however, when 
Western numbers do not match up with those provided by the Warsaw Pact.
One of the most difficult problems at the Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reductions (MBFR) Talks in Vienna was this inability to agree on the levels 
of tanks and other forces. One of the beauties of a restricted tank zone is that 
it nicely sidesteps the whole problem, as will be illustrated later.
Quality
So far, the picture is not particularly comforting for NATO. The quality 
of forces used in the battle, however, could be decisive. Both the East and the 
West are making technical improvements in their equipment, and both sides
8have some advantages. NATO is generally credited, however, with having 
an advantage in over-all quality of weapons systems. (18) How do?s the 
quality of tanks systems compare?
There are four main factors in assessing tank quality: observation, fire 
power, mobility and armour protection. (19) NATO tanks have a 
comparative advantage in all of them.
Battles are usually quite confusing and it may become difficult for 
soldiers inside of a tank to know what is going on outside. It is imperative, 
however, that they be able to "see", one way or another. The early Soviet 
tanks, the T-54's, T-55's, and T-62's are all considered to be of much lower 
quality in this category than any NATO tank built after 1950. (20) Soviet tank 
commanders still have to stick their heads out of the tank in order to see the 
battle. (21) The Soviets still must use "active" nightvision, such as white or 
infrared searchlights which makes them easy to spot. NATO, however, has 
developed a "passive" form of illumination, thermal imaging. The result is 
that at night or during the confusion of battle, we can see them, but they 
cannot see us. (22)
The quality of firepower is determined by the type of guns and 
ammunition used and the capability of the sights and fire control. In older 
tanks, such as the Leopard 1, the M-48A5, the M-60A3, and the early versions 
of the M-l Abrams the West uses the British-made L7 (rifled) 105mm. (23) It 
fires faster and with more force than the DIOT, used in older Pact tanks. The 
Pact gained an advantage in force with its T-62 tank but this was largely offset 
by its inaccuracy. Although NATO has not significantly improved the L7, it 
still fires heavier shells over longer distances than any of the Soviet guns. (24) 
The extensive use of ballistic computers on most of its tanks has given NATO
9the advantage in the sights used for targeting and in the fire control. Mobility 
of tanks is divided into two categories: tactical and operational. Tactical 
mobility involves how easily a tank can move in a battle and operation 
mobility involves getting the tanks to the battle. The most recent NATO 
tanks, the Leopard 2 and the M-l, have the advantage in the first category by 
providing a higher power-weight ratio and a better design for the terrain. (26) 
They have the advantage in the latter category by being more reliable. (27)
Finally, NATO tanks have, in general, better armour. NATO took and 
has retained the technical lead in fitting their tanks with composite armour. 
(28) The Pact appears to have been unable to develop this type of armour and 
has developed its own reactive armour instead (29) The poor engine strength 
of their tanks, however, has severely impeded their ability to apply their 
technologies because their tanks cannot support the additional weight. (30) 
Therefore, "almost all T-54, T-55, and T-62 tanks in service, together 
accounting for 70% of the Warsaw Pact fleet, are fitted with neither composite 
nor reactive... armour.” (31)
Force Readiness
How well prepared each side's standing forces are for battle could 
determine whether or not the battle is won within the first few days. The 
speed with which forces can mobilize is important. If a victory is not reached 
within the first week or so, how quickly reinforcements can be brought to the 
front also becomes important.
Traditionally, there has been a trade-off between a troop's size and its 
readiness. The different choices of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact 
reflect their different doctrines and strategics. NATO places a greater
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emphases on readiness than size due to the fact that its doctrine is defensive.
It must be prepared to face the large-scale attack that the Pact's doctrine 
favors. (32)
NATO divides its forces into four levels of readiness, C-l through C-4. 
C-l is Fully Ready, has at least 90% of its personnel and equipment there, with 
90% of the equipment being rated mission capable, and needs fewer than two 
weeks of training. C-2 is Substantially Ready, has 60% of its personnel and 
equipment and 70% of the equipment rated as mission capable, but needs 
three to four weeks training. C-3 is Marginally Ready, has only 70% of its 
personnel, 65% of its equipment, only 60% of which is mission capable, and 
needs five to six weeks to train. Finally, C-4 is Not Ready with no more than 
65% of the necessary personnel and equipment and needing some seven 
weeks to be ready for battle. (33) Anything above C-4 is considered "combat 
ready" and in 1961, fifteen of the sixteen active duty U.S. Army divisions were 
rated above C-4. (34)
Soviet divisions are ranked by NATO in three categories. Category I, 
which includes one-fourth of all Soviet divisions and all thirty of the ones in 
Eastern Europe, has a minimum of 75% of its personnel, 100% of its weapons, 
and can be ready for combat within 24 hours. Category n, however could take 
anywhere from 3 to 30 days to be ready and is maintained at only 50-75% 
strength. Category III divisions have at best 10-20% of their manpower and 
would take 90 to 120 days. Almost half of the Soviet divisions are in this last 
category. (35)
As can be seen from the numbers above, the lowest rating a NATO 
division can receive and still be considered ready for combat is better manned 
and equipped than the Soviet's second-ranked division. Since Category 1
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divisions may be missing as much as one-fourth of its strength, even they 
may not be much better prepared than die C-3 divisions. (36)
As far as the other factors that make up readiness are concerned, NATO 
enjoys a dear superiority. The Soviets do not have "reserve units" in the 
Western sense, and their rear support services are not always manned during 
peacetime. The reservist are not told in advance which units they would be 
assigned to replace and probably will not have trained with that unit. (37) 
Their training program, in general, pails in comparison to the West's. They 
do not have a separate basic training for conscripts and the training they do 
receive is much less extensive. NATO exercises are both larger and more 
realistic. (38) In sum, the general readiness or NATO's active duty forces and 
its reserve forces are much higher than that of its Pact counterparts, and this 
would surely be a significant factor in any conventional conflict In Europe.
Sustainability
As with force readiness, doctrine and strategy are important in the 
planning that effects each side's sustainability. NATO's doctrine of nuclear 
deterrence helps to explain why it lades sufficient stockpiles of consumable 
material. NATO nations disagree among themselves as to the value of 
conventional sustainability and thus the existing supply stockpiles are not 
high. This is one of NATO's most severe problems because they face a 
Warsaw Pact force that forward deploys stockpiles in Eastern Europe that the 
West estimates will last 60 to 90 days. (39) Hie Pact has considerable logistic 
problems, however, and their ability to move their supplies to die front line 
becomes more and more questionable with time, perhaps within 10 to 12 
days. (40) So while the Warsaw Pact is presently credited with die advantage,
12
it is not an overwhelming one, and it would likely change soon after the war 
began. (41)
Number of Active and Reserve Personnel and Quality of Personnel
These two categories are important to the over-all balance of forces in 
Europe, but of less importance to the questions of tank restrictions, 
specifically. For that reason, little space is given to them here.
The question of comparative troop levels is similar to the question of 
comparative tank levels earlier; it depends of who is counting and who and 
where they count. IISS lists them as roughly equal:
NATO Guidelines Area AtUndc-to-Urais
Manpower NATO WP NATO WP
Active forces 796,000 995,000 2385,000 2392300
Reserve forces 922,000 1,030,000 4371,000 4376,000 (42)
The quality of the forces is measured in terms of training, morale, and 
leadership. (43) These are difficult areas to quantify, and many sources are 
reluctant to do so, but they do influence the effectiveness of the force. In all 
three categories, NATO is rated higher than the Warsaw Pact. The impact of 
each, however, would certainly vary with each battle. The general morale of 
each side, for example, could depend on whether it was winning or loosing.
This catsgoiy evaluates foe ability of each alliance to share 
ammunition, spare parts, and fuel with foe alliance and foe advantage is
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clearly to the Pact. (44) This Is due largely to the Soviet Union's ability to 
command consistency within the Warsaw Pact and the ardent independence 
of the NATO countries in armament production. (45)
C3I
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) is difficult 
to evaluate as a unit. It involves how well each alliance's command 
structure would perform during a war and the technological capabilities of 
intelligence-gathering equipment and communications networks. (46) Like 
the personnel categories above, C5I is important to the balance as a whole but 
not as important for the conventional arms control plan proposed by this 
paper. NATO's C3I is rated higher as a unit than the Pact's alliance, due 
mainly to its technological capabilities, but the Pact's centralised command 
structure gives it an advantage at the theater level. (47) This would be most 
Important at the outset of war, but if the battle lasts for more than a few days, 
the advantage will start to swing towards NATO. (48)
Reliability of Allies
This factor could be one of the most important of all the factors 
discussed here. The cohesiveness of each alliance could make the difference 
between winning and loosing a war.
NATO members could never be accused of having monolithic 
approaches to policy, yet there is little doubt that they would respond in 
unison to an actual attack. Even though Prance is not officially in NATO's 
military structure, French leaders indicate that they would send in troops. (49)
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The problem NATO potentially faces is one of agreeing to mobilize in the face 
of Pact mobilization. (50)
The Soviets, however, have much deeper problems with their allies. 
The very deployment of Soviet forces itself indicates their insecurity about 
non-Soviet Pact support. (51) The Soviets also deny the allies their best 
equipment to insure that it cannot be used against them. (52) It is hard to 
imagine that Poland and Czechoslovakia would not defend their homelands 
if they were attacked, but it is questionable if they would help the Soviets 
invade Western Europe. The advantage is to NATO in this category.
Economic and Industrial Strength
A nation's military strength is largely a reflection of the economic 
resources the country can put into it. The strength of a country's industry 
directly affects its ability to sustain a war. The economies of the West have a 
clear advantage in this category and this advantage would become more 
apparent the longer the war lasted. (53)
Geography
West Germany provides a very "shallow" area for defense. NATO's 
North and Central army groups are deployed approximately 200 km west of 
the border and the main supply lines and 90% of the support facilities and air 
bases are only another 100 km back. (54) NATO forces could not afford to 
retreat more than about 150 km from the border.
Yet the nature of being a defensive force gives NATO a significant 
advantage. They will not have the element of surprise in their favor, but 
they know the land well from having trained there. The North German
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plain is comparatively flat, but not as flat as the open steppe on which the 
Soviets train. (55) North Germany has a number of natural and man-made 
obstacles that the Soviets are unfamiliar with. There are only three or four 
points where the Soviets would be able to attempt a conventional attack, and 
NATO logically concentrates its defense effort at these points, rather than 
stringing troops and equipment out along the entire border. (56) In addition, 
these attack routes are quite nar.ow and the Pact forces would have to remain 
in tight columns until they gained significant ground. (57) They would make 
good targets for NATO's air defenses.
If the Soviets are able to convince or coerce the rest of the Warsaw Pact 
into supporting the war effort, East Germany and Poland become one big 
geographical for bringing in troops, equipment, and supplies, although the 
area is vulnerable to air attack. NATO's reinforcement units, in contrast, 
would have to travel over either the Atlantic Ocean or the English channel. 
Sea travel is slower than land or rail passage, and it could take NATO 
countries anywhere from 2 to 4 weeks to bring reinforcements to the front. 
(58)
In terms of geography, then, the advantage to NATO is only during the 
first few days of the war. If the Soviets are able to push NATO forces back 
more than 150 km, NATO would risk losing most of its support facilities and 
its main supply line, and possible the war.
When all factors are considered, the conventional balance in Europe 
today is stable. Neither side has a dear advantage and neither side is likely to 
think it could easily mount a successful surprise attack during peacetime. But 
flte balance is not stable enough to predude either ride from being tempted to
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mount a surprise attack during a crises. So while the balance is good, it is not 
good enough for either side to feel secure. The need for conventional arms 
control becomes especially apparent when the discussion turns to greater 
nuclear disarmament. As Italian Ambassador to London Boris Biancheri 
Chiappori emphasized,
It is therefore clearly necessary to overcome this... source of 
threat and distrust before we can decisively and successfully 
proceed along the path towards more general disarmament. It 
should also be emphasized that our efforts are not directed at 
disarmament as such but at that kind of disarmament which is 
designed to increase stability at lower levels of forces. (59)
* * * *
Ambassador Jonathan Dean, former U.S. Ambassador to the MBFR 
Talks, proposed a zone free of all offensive systems (tanks, self-propelled 
artillery, and attack helicopters) that would cover 100 km west and 150 km 
east of the inner-German border. (60) This is a type of non-provocative 
defense, a concept that urges each side to pull out all of their "offensive" 
weapons but leave their "defensive" weapons in place. This is a goal NATO 
planners should keep in mind when formulating negotiations, but it is too 
much to expect in one step. Dean himself argues that arms control 
negotiations should move cautiously. (61) Arms control is meant to increase 
stability; too much of a change could decrease stability. It would also be 
politically difficult to achieve if either side believed it was giving up too 
much at once. Dean's proposal would be better if it were modified so that a 
complete free zone is the long-term goal, but a tank-restricted zone is the first 
step.
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Tanks as Offensive Systems
Tanks are the best weapons systems to begin with because in a purely 
conventional attack, it is impossible to breakthrough either side's defense 
lines without them. Neither armored personnel carriers (APC's) nor self- 
propelled artillery can do the job. The armour on each is too thin and they 
are vulnerable to any conventional missile. (62) The air forces of each side 
have enough power to destroy a given area, but they cannot hold the land. In 
Central Europe, there is no reason to use conventional forces unless the 
attacker wants the land. Simple destruction could be accomplished at a lower 
cost with nuclear weapons.
Tanks are also comparatively easy to verify. A column of tanks would 
be discemable from 60 to 80 miles up the air. Their steel content makes them 
relatively easy to find on a radar, too. (63)
Finally, tanks are the best political choice because they are the most 
offensive of the conventional ground force weapons systems. NATO could 
gain considerable public support both, in Europe and domestically, by 
proposing to restrict visibly offensive tank systems while allowing all 
defensive systems to remain in place. Many Europeans still have strong 
memories of tank invasions during World War n. If NATO were to make 
this proposal, it could also win back some popular support from Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's apparent break with the approach to arms 
control of his predecessors has won the backing of many Europeans who now 
view NATO, and especially the United States, as the intransigents in arms 
control.
Restricted Zone vt " Zone
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There are a number of beauties in proposing a tank-restricted area 
instead of a strict reduction of forces. The main advantage is that no country 
has to give up any ol their tanks; they simply have to move them. No 
leadership must leave its countrv in a militarily weakened position. No 
bureaucracy is forced to give up part of its budget. No country is asked to give 
up sovereignty over the combat use of their weapons. The only change is in 
the tanks' location.
This plan can also avoid some of the problems that have brought the 
MBFR talks to a standstill. The main problem has been an inability of the two 
sides to agree on the existing troop levels. MBFR sought to set ceilings for 
troop levels, and would require each side to pull out forces to stay under 
those ceilings. But the actual number of troops each side would have to pull 
out varies quite a bit depending on whose data is used. (64) A tank-restricted 
plan avoids the problem in two ways. First, the plan deals with tanks, not 
people, and tanks are easier to verify. Second, the number of tanka allowed to 
remain would be so low that it would be easier to tell if there were flagrant 
violations and minor violations would not be militarily significant.
Acceptability
NATO countries have nothing to lose from this agreement. Soviet 
tanks would be placed beyond the point where they oould beat NATO tanks 
bade to the front line. While it does not guarantee NATO security for now 
and forever, the scheme does reduos the potential for threat to Western 
Burope. Its success could also be the foundation on which to build more 
tx ttiu iv f Anni control ic i t in i i i t i ,
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The Soviets are more likely to accept a tank-restricted area titan they 
would a complete free zone, mainly for political reasons. If there is an 
uprising in an Eastern European country the Soviets may not be willing to 
leave the government on its own to suppress it. Tanks are not efficient 
weapons alone for suppressing local uprisings/ but a few  tanks parked on the 
borders of a capital city or outside of a factory full of striking workers can have 
an enormous effect on the courage and morale of the agitators.
The issue here is to distinguish between the type and number of tanks 
needed for this sort of "police" function and the type and number needed to 
successfully invade Western Europe. This is not a difficult distinction to 
make. The Soviet T-54, T-55, and T-62's, for example/ are all sufficiently 
threatening when used against striking workers/ but are not reliable enough 
to seriously threaten Western Europe. None of the three types can be 
significantly upgraded, either. (69) A limited number of them In Hasten) 
Europe would allow the Soviets to keep control but not tempt them to heed 
West.
It should be noted here that It Is not the goal of NATO to allow the 
Soviet Union to repress Bast European protests. But it is the responsibility of 
NATO planners to design an arms control agreement that is both effective 
and acceptable to both sides. However much Western oountries may support 
the Polish Solidarity movement, for example, they must accept the political 
reality that the Soviets are unlikely to nuke large concessions on this type of
Issue right now. If NATO attempts to deny the Soviets hegemony In this
mEAEasasa EilnAonl l  at aaas lea tA oaeill 4Liaa£nAA Alaaa aiamoMMiAatainiAa* Aaatfe ten laenj i l t ,  tim er wmamy in cuvet* it w*«i roneii m v opponuiuiy to n u i in m
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forces, the Soviets may feel more secure about granting greater independence 
to the Eastern block countries. But they cannot be rushed into reducing their 
control. NATO must have the patience to move slowly and to accept small 
gains gradually, rather than risk the chance for any benefits at all by 
challenging Soviet authority in Eastern Europe.
This plan avoids the "zero-sum" concept of arms control, where one
side's gain is met by the other side's loss. Both sides can make significant
gains without making significant concessions. This promotes the feeling that
both sides are working towards a common goal. The gains from that could be
reaped later during negotiations for more extensive force reductions, for both
nuclear an conventional weapons.
* * * •
There are five main issues that diplomats and strategists must address 
to construct a tank-restricted sons: placement, logistics (as a function of 
distance), positioning, verification, and time. This final section discusses fee 
problems in each of these categories and provides some solutions for foam.
Placement
Placement is a political problem, more so for the NATO countries than 
for foe Warsaw Pact If tanks are restricted within a certain sons in Central 
Buropo, what is to be done with foe tanks that are already there?
On foe Pact side, foe Soviets can pull their tanks back into foe Soviet 
Union* But that still leaves the Polish, Caechoeiovikian, and Bast Carman 
tanks to oontant Pith* Would ttc h  country b t wttttna to ntova in  tanks out 
of ths country, and oostlbiv Into Aka Soviet Union? B a r  may not Hava
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much of a choice. Here the Soviet's hegemony in the region could work to 
NATO's advantage, albeit in a Machiavellian way. The Soviets could 
command the placement of the Eastern block tanks out of their respective 
countries if it meant that NATO tanks would be pulled out of West Germany.
The political problems of tank relocation are much more difficult for 
NATO. The United States, Great Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
could confine all of their tanks to Belgium and the Netherlands, but this 
would take a great deal of inner-alliance negotiation. The Dutch and Belgian 
people may not be enthusiastic, initially, at the idea of an influx of tanks in 
their respective homelands. They would have to accept the idea as the first 
part of a larger plan and that the tanks are not meant to be there indefinitely. 
They would have to be willing to take the risk in the belief that the success of 
the tank-restricted zone could lead to real reductions, where American and 
British tanks would then leave Belgium and the Netherlands. They would 
have to take the risk that it could be a long time before the next phase 
happened. This may not be an insurmountable task if they accept the premise 
of the plan, that it will increase stability by decreasing the potential for a 
conventional first strike.
What about the West German tanks? The first option to explore 
should be that of moving them into France. Franco-German military co­
operation is on the rise; the September, 1967 Saucy Sparrow Joint exercise in 
Bavaria was significantly East of the boundaries France set for its exercises in 
1966. (66) French President Francois Mitterrand claimed the exercise proved 
France's ability to help its West Germany quickly once the political decision to 
do so had been made. (67) In addition, French forces may soon be conducting 
Joint exercises with other NATO forces in Europe. (68) The French are even
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considering establishing a Franco-German Defense Council to give political 
guidance (although it would have no legal authority), to movement towards 
greater military co-operation. (69) All of these measure build upon the 1963 
Elysee Treaty. The willingness of the French to upgrade their political and 
military commitments to Germany is seen by many, Including high-level 
German officials, as a move toward greater commitment to NATO as a 
whole. German State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense asserts that,
The governments of both countries have also made it quite 
plain that their common purpose is to strengthen the Alliance 
with their co-operation over military and security policy,... to 
support the forward defence in the Central Region, and to 
facilitate French participation in the common defence...(70)
Within this context of greater French participation in the European 
defense effort, the idea of German tanks stationed in France does not seem 
unrealistic. It accords the French a significant role in a NATO without 
demanding the French formally rejoin the actual military structure of it.
The necessary roles of the French, the Belgians, and the Dutch 
underscore the importance of Western co-operation before the negotiations 
begin. The United States cannot simply negotiate with foe Soviets as they did 
on foe INF Treaty. German participation was required then, but was mom 
easily realized when West Germany was the only other NATO country 
involved and the treaty involved foe removal of weapons. This proposal 
requires foe stationing of American, British, and German tanks on the soil of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. Their agreement and participation is 
imperative.
IfTgtortO
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The backbone of the plan la to move each aide's tanka back far enough 
to diminish their ability to execute a surprise attack. How far back is far 
enough?
Tanks do not drive to the war. They are brought in by rail or on trucks. 
There are a limited amount of railroads and roadways on either side that 
could be used in a mass mobilization. The Soviets, for example, have only 
four or five railroads that run from their border, through Poland and East 
Germany, to the Central Front Region. Trains must stop at the Soviet-Polish 
border because European trains run on a more narrow gauge track than do 
Soviet trains. (71) These "transportation choke points" (72) are prime targets 
for NATO air strikes. NATO's air forces could not only destroy the tracks 
themselves, but would destroy the cars, too. Tracks are easily replaced; 
railway cars are not. (73) The roadway needed for trucks to move them in 
could be destroyed in a similar manner. If Pact tanks are pulled back to the 
Soviet Union, any attempt to mobilize would likely be stopped before drey got 
very far into Poland. (74)
The plan, in effect,is asymmetrical in terms of distance, with 
Pact tanks back farther than NATO tanks. This is not the main aim of 
the agreement; it is more a function of geography. But this will not 
necessarily predude Soviet acceptance of the agreement. In May, 1967, 
the Warsaw Pa<. stated, in reference to conventional reductions, that 
the Pact is willing "to remove any disparity that may have arisen in 
some elements in the course of reductions by bringing about a 
reduction on the side of die one who has an advantage." (75)
Gorbachev himrelf stated die need for "die elimination of asymmetry 
and imbalance [in conventional forces] by reducing accordingly the
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arms of the power that is in the lead...." (76) This is an unprecedented 
acknowledgement on the Part of the Soviet Union of the existence of 
their numerical advantage in conventional force levels, and a 
willingness to correct it. NATO may be able to extend this acceptance, 
in theory, of an asymmetrical reduction to an acceptance of an 
asymmetrical tank-restricted zone. The latter may actually be more 
acceptable to the Soviets because they are allowed to retain, for the time 
being, their numerical advantage. This may help Gorbachev counter 
internal Soviet criticism from hard-liners who attack him for 
conceding too much to NATO.
Positioning
Where will the tanks be parked specifically, once they reach their 
country of destination? There are two answers to this question. The 
first is to park the tanks in designated camps. The second is to allow 
them to be dispersed, their location restricted only by the host country.
The latter is the better choice. Parking the tanks in specific 
camps would make verification easier; any movement out of the 
camps would be quickly noted. But the camps would also make 
attractive targets if international tensions were high. Either side could 
be tempted to eliminate the other's tanks with either air strikes or 
ballistic missiles. Since the purpose of the agreement is to reduce the 
temptations for such preemptive strikes, the tanks should be dispersed 
throughout the area behind the boundaries of the restricted zone. This 
may hamper verification somewhat, but not by much. A large line of 
tanks, with enough to launch an attack, would be relatively easy to
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spot. That much armour would surely show on a radar, even from 
great distances. (72) The bulk of the verification will be aimed at the 
restricted zone and at the appropriate transportation routes that lead to 
it. What each country does with its tanks is not critical as long as they 
are out of the zone.
Verification
Verification would be comprised of both human and technical 
types. The intensive verification measures needed for this agreement 
have their precedent in two earlier agreements: the Conference on 
Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe (CDE) and the INF Treaty. The former was the first to allow 
surprise inspections and observation of the other alliance's military 
exercises. In the INF Treaty, verification reached new heights by 
allowing on-site inspection of both production and elimination 
facilities. The principles embodied in eadt could be extended to cover a 
restricted zone.
Outside of the restricted zone, satellite and air surveillance 
would continue to cover Central Europe. Human observers could be 
placed at the critical transportation points, such as where the rail cars 
must change tracks on the Soviet-Polish border and along the 
highways that would be likely mobilization. Comparable points could 
be found on the NATO side. Within the zone, verification would 
have to be intensive to insure that the number of tanks did not exceed 
the allowable limits. Here it may be necessary for each side to know 
exactly where the other's tanks are.
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A Warsaw Pact statement in 1986 called for the creation of an 
international commission that would consist of representatives from 
both alliances and representatives fiom the non-aligned nations. They 
suggest that this committee be a part of the on-site verification process 
to insure objectivity. (78) This may be possible, but NATO should be 
cautious as to which of the non-aligned countries are represented. It 
would be possible for the Warsaw Pact to try to build an anti-Western 
coalition. Some sort of veto power over the non-aligned nations 
membership should be given to each alliance. Each side could reject a 
set number of countries.
Time
The final main issue is to design a timetable for the agreement.
It is necessary to remember that speed is not a goal in and of itself; 
stability is. If a rapid tank pull-back creates more instability than it 
eliminates, th? tanks should be pulled back in a phased manner. Each 
side could puli 15 to 25% of their tanks back in the first year and 
examine the results. This would give nations can analyze their 
verification methods and and work out any political difficulties. If the 
plan seems to be working, the percent reduction for tire remaining 
tanks could be increased. The pull-back could be competed within five 
to ten years.
Remaining Details
As with all treaties, a committee would be appointed to hear 
complaints on cheating or to work out any interpretation problems.
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They would review the treaty after the first year, the fifth year, and 
every five years thereafter. The treaty would have indefinite duration 
and any country could withdrawal with six months notice.
♦ ♦ * *
The success of this agreement couid lead to greater conventional 
and nuclear reductions. Other "offensive" conventional forces, such as 
armored personnel carriers and attack helicopters could be next to be 
pulled out of the restricted zone. Perhaps, with the success of the treaty 
over a significant period, the restricted zone could be turned into a 
pure free zone, depending mainly on developments within Eastern 
Europe. Either way, a successful treaty on a restricted zone should calm 
enough fears in both alliances that significant headway could be made 
on strategic force reductions.
It is a prime time to discuss conventional reductions. Both 
alliances would have financial difficulties if they had to increase 
spending on conventional weapons. Prominent defense specialists, 
both in and out of government, in both alliances are calling for 
conventional reductions. The tank-restricted zone would described in 
this paper would add security and stability in Europe, possibly set the 
stage for more extensive conventional and nuclear arms control 
agreements, promote inner-alliance co-operation, and not cause any 
financial or security risks to NATO. NATO countries now have the 
opportunity to conclude a successful treaty on conventional weapons 
with foe Warsaw Pact countries. It would be foolish of them not to 
take it.
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